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RECONCILIATION IN THE WAKE OF TRAGEDY:
CAMBODIA’S EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS
UNDERMINES THE CAMBODIAN CONSTITUTION
Tessa V. Capeloto†
Abstract: Between 1975 and 1979, the Khmer Rouge regime was responsible for
approximately 1.7 million deaths caused by deportation, starvation, murder, and torture.
In 2001, Cambodia established the Extraordinary Chambers, an internationalized
domestic tribunal, or “hybrid court,” to prosecute the perpetrators most responsible for
these atrocities. As the Cambodian government’s primary legal response to the Khmer
Rouge, the tribunal conflicts with the requirements of Article 52 of the Cambodian
Constitution, an article that requires a policy of national reconciliation to ensure national
unity. Cultural conceptions of national reconciliation coupled with the legislative history
and purpose of the constitution strongly suggest that this provision disallows the
Cambodian government from pursuing laws and policies that undermine truth or national
healing. However, because of the Extraordinary Chambers’ questionable impartiality,
limited public involvement, and constrained personal jurisdiction, this tribunal
undermines the very truth and healing that are essential to national reconciliation.
Cambodia should therefore look to other mechanisms of transitional justice to
supplement its tribunal. Given the political and economic infeasibility of a “truth and
reconciliation commission,” Cambodia should establish informal mechanisms of
transitional justice to supplement its tribunal and further national reconciliation.

I.

INTRODUCTION

As one of thousands of killing fields sprinkled throughout Cambodia,
Choeung Ek was a burial ground for Cambodians arrested and tortured at the
Tuol Sleng prison in Phnom Penh.1 After prison guards tortured their
victims, these innocent Cambodians “were usually forced to kneel at the
edge of the mass graves while guards clubbed them on the back of the neck
or head with a hoe or spade.”2 Researchers believe that the Khmer Rouge
executed over 20,000 Cambodians at this site alone.3 With countless killing
fields now a permanent part of the Cambodian landscape, the human rights
abuses perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge are considered among the worst in
human history.4

†
The author would like to thank her family, Professor Kristen Stilt, and her wonderful editors at the
Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal to whom she owes enormous gratitude.
1
See Wynne Cougill, Documentation Center of Cambodia, Buddhist Cremation Traditions for the
Dead and the Need to Preserve Forensic Evidence in Cambodia, http://www.dccam.org/Projects/
Maps/Buddhist_Cremation_Traditions.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2007).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
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Almost three decades after these mass killings, Cambodia established
the Extraordinary Chambers (“CEC”) to prosecute those most responsible
for this terror. Neither an international nor a domestic court, Cambodia’s
CEC belongs to a new category of tribunals referred to as “hybrid courts.”5
Hybrid courts, or internationalized domestic courts,6 are a unique blend of
international tribunals and domestic courts.7 Though based in the domestic
legal system, hybrid courts maintain the international support, legal
guidance, and expertise of an international tribunal.8
Both Cambodian and international officials have emphasized the
potential for Cambodia’s hybrid court to promote national reconciliation.9
However, as the government’s primary legal response to the Khmer Rouge,
Cambodia’s CEC undermines Article 52 of the Cambodian Constitution,
which requires Cambodia to “adopt the policy of national reconciliation to
ensure national unity . . . .”10 As it currently functions, the CEC is
characterized by questionable impartiality, limited public involvement, and
restricted personal jurisdiction. These shortcomings weaken the very truth
and healing that are essential to the policy of national reconciliation.
With the Khmer Rouge trials anticipated to begin in 2008,11 an
examination of the relationship between the CEC and Article 52 is of timely
importance. Part II of this comment provides a brief background of the
Cambodian genocide, the prosecution of the worst Khmer Rouge offenders,
and the CEC. Part III examines Article 52 of the Cambodian Constitution,
including the cultural meaning of national reconciliation and the
constitution’s legislative history in order to explain “the policy of national
5
Etelle R. Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts: Local Empowerment and National Criminal
Justice Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 347, 353 (2006).
6
Though this comment will focus exclusively on Cambodia’s hybrid tribunal, Sierra Leone and
East Timor are two countries in which hybrid courts have been recently established. See Suzannah Linton,
Cambodia, East Timor, and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International Justice, 12 CRIM. L.F. 185, 185
(2001).
7
See YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AGAINST IMPUNITY: PROGRESS AND NEW
CHALLENGES 113 (2005) (tracing the historical, political, and legal development of various international
and domestic tribunals as well as hybrid courts such as the Extraordinary Chambers).
8
William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal
Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2002).
9
Such officials include the Cambodian Commissioner General to the National Police. Hok Lundy,
Thoughts on the Khmer Rouge Regime and Trial, PHNOM PENH POST (Cambodia), Apr. 8, 2005, available
at http://www.phnompenhpost.com/TXT/comments/c1407-6.htm. The former United Nations Chief
Negotiator between the U.N. and Cambodia has also expressed optimism in the tribunal’s ability to
promote reconciliation. Ed Cropley, UN, Cambodia Sign Deal on Khmer Rouge Trial, REUTERS, June 6,
2003.
10
KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA CONSTITUTION, art. 52 (1993) reprinted in RAOUL M. JENNAR, THE
CAMBODIAN CONSTITUTIONS (1953-1993), at 8 (1995).
11
Khmer Rouge Trials Ready to Start, BBC NEWS, June 13, 2007, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/asia-pacific/6747143.stm.
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reconciliation to ensure national unity . . . .”12 It concludes that Article 52
prevents Cambodia from enacting policies that undermine truth and national
healing. Part IV evaluates the legal and political limitations of the CEC,
including an uncertain guarantee of impartiality, limited public involvement,
and constrained personal jurisdiction. Part V argues that as a result of these
limitations, the CEC conflicts with Article 52 by undermining both truth and
healing. Finally, Part VI recommends that Cambodia should supplement its
CEC with informal mechanisms of transitional justice that can adequately
address the CEC’s weaknesses,13 rather than implement an economically and
politically unfeasible “truth and reconciliation commission” (“TRC”).14
Cambodia’s implementation of these supplemental mechanisms can help
address the tension between the CEC and Article 52 and bring Cambodians
closer to reconciliation in the wake of their tragedy.
II.

CAMBODIA’S MODERN HISTORY IS CHARACTERIZED BY WAR, DEATH,
DESTRUCTION, AND DELAYED ACCOUNTABILITY

Cambodia’s post-colonial history has been anything but calm and
stable. War, death, destruction, and delayed accountability have traumatized
Cambodia since its independence from France in 1953.15 Because
Cambodia’s history is essential to understanding its current response to the
Khmer Rouge, a brief introduction to the atrocities committed by the Khmer
Rouge and the events leading up to the creation of the CEC is essential.
A.

The Khmer Rouge Terrorized Cambodia Between 1975 and 1979

In 1963, the United States launched massive air bombing campaigns
in Cambodia, campaigns that produced mass Cambodian casualties.16
Angered by the death and destruction caused by the United States, many
Cambodians shifted their political support to Cambodia’s communist Khmer
Rouge forces, thus enabling the Khmer Rouge leader, Pol Pot, to topple the
American-supported Lon Nol government.17 Any potential for peace and
12

Id.
Transitional justice refers to a wide a range of approaches that societies adopt in response to mass
human rights atrocities as these societies move from a state of violence to one of peace and stability.
International Center for Transitional Justice, What Is Transitional Justice?, http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/ (last
visited Nov. 30, 2007).
14
“Truth and reconciliation commission” is a term of art that denotes a particular institution of
transitional justice. See infra Part VI.B.
15
JENNAR, supra note 10, at 35.
16
BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 129.
17
Id.
13
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stability after Lon Nol’s departure, however, quickly dissipated with the
Khmer Rouge’s rise to power.18
Under the Khmer Rouge regime, Cambodia suffered the worst mass
murder of the twentieth century in terms of the percentage of its population
killed.19 The Khmer Rouge tortured and killed many individuals perceived
as having dangerous ethnic, political, and social identities.20 Persecuted
peoples included the Cham (a Muslim sect), teachers, students, and religious
leaders and institutions.21 In order to purge society of traitors within the
Communist Party, the Khmer Rouge arrested and executed “suspected
individuals within the leadership of each unit” as well as “all of the Party
cadres in a unit considered treacherous.”22
In addition to murder, the Khmer Rouge pursued policies of torture,
slave labor, and forced evacuations while in power.23 With urban centers
perceived as breeding grounds for dissidents, during its first week in power
alone, the Khmer Rouge Government expelled two to three million people
from its cities.24 The Khmer Rouge terrorized Cambodian society until
approximately 1979.25
In response to a full-scale invasion by the Vietnamese in December
1978,26 the Khmer Rouge fled to the forests. During this period, the United
States, China, and Thailand, all enemies of Vietnam, provided continuous
arms and support to the Khmer Rouge.27 Despite this assistance to the
Khmer Rouge, a pro-Vietnamese government successfully installed itself in
Cambodia shortly after Vietnam’s invasion.28 In 1991, the Agreements on a
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, signed by
Cambodia during the Paris Conference on Cambodia, established the U.N.
18

WILFRED P. DEAC, ROAD

TO THE

KILLING FIELDS: THE CAMBODIAN WAR

OF

1970-1975 215

(1997).
19

Craig Etcheson, The Politics of Genocide Justice in Cambodia, in INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL
COURTS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST TIMOR, KOSOVO, AND CAMBODIA 181, 182 (Cesare P. R. Romano et al. eds.,
2004).
20
Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established Pursuant to General Assembly
Resolution 52/135, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 110(b), ¶¶ 24-28, U.N. Doc. A/53/850,
S/1999/231 (1999) [hereinafter Report of the Group of U.N. Experts].
21
Id. ¶ 26.
22
Id. ¶ 29.
23
Id. ¶¶ 19-45.
24
Id. ¶ 19.
25
See BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 129.
26
Scholars have advanced two competing explanations for Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia: 1)
Vietnam wished to liberate Cambodians from the Khmer Rouge and 2) Vietnam wished to annex Khmer
territory for purposes of Vietnamese expansion. Ronnie Yimsut, Vietnam: Was It Liberation or Invasion,
http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/jan7.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
27
Report of the Group of U.N. Experts, supra note 20, ¶ 29.
28
BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 129-30.
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Transitional Authority in Cambodia (“UNTAC”).29 The U.N. entrusted the
UNTAC with organizing the elections of Cambodia’s Constituent Assembly,
the institution that ultimately adopted Cambodia’s Constitution in 1993.30
Only with the initiation of peace talks and the subsequent creation of
Cambodia’s 1993 Constitution did Cambodia attain relative calm and
stability in the years following the defeat of the Khmer Rouge.31
B.

Holding the Khmer Rouge Legally Accountable for Their Crimes
Encountered Significant Delay

In the decades following the genocide,32 neither Cambodia nor the
international community took significant steps towards bringing the Khmer
Rouge to justice.33 In 1997, the U.N. received a letter from then Second
Prime Minister Hun Sen seeking assistance in bringing the Khmer Rouge to
justice.34 In 1998, U.N. Secretary General (“U.N. SG”) Kofi Annan
appointed a group of experts (“U.N. Experts”) to explore various legal
avenues for holding the Khmer Rouge accountable.35 The U.N. Experts
primarily considered two options: 1) an international tribunal and 2) a
Cambodian tribunal established under Cambodian law.36
In 1999, the U.N. Experts recommended that the Security Council or
the General Assembly establish an ad hoc,37 purely international tribunal.38
They argued that an international tribunal would hold the Khmer Rouge
29

JENNAR, supra note 10, at 7.
Id.
31
BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 129-30.
32
Between 1979 and 1997, the only Khmer Rouge political trials were Vietnamese show trials
conducted of Khmer Rouge leaders Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. They were both condemned to death in
absentia. BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 130. Further, in 1997, a “surreal trial” of Pol Pot was conducted by
the Cambodians. Id. Though condemned to life imprisonment, Pol Pot died on April 16, 1998. Id. at 13031.
33
Initial delay resulted from the disinclination of China and the United States to reveal Khmer
Rouge atrocities because of their prior support for the Khmer Rouge regime. Later delay, however,
resulted from the conflict between the U.N.’s insistence on an international tribunal and Cambodia’s push
for a domestic court. Id. at 138.
34
Id. at 131.
35
Id. at 132.
36
Identical Letters Dated 99/03/03 from the Permanent Representative of Cambodia to the United
Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council, 53d. Sess.,
Agenda Item 110 (b), U.N. Doc., A/53/850, S/1999/231 (March 16, 1999) [hereinafter Security Council
Letter]. The U.N. Experts most strongly considered an international or domestic tribunal for Cambodia;
however, five possible options were technically on the table: a tribunal established under Cambodian law;
an ad hoc international tribunal; a hybrid option of a Cambodian tribunal under U.N. administration; an
international tribunal established by multilateral treaty; and trials conducted in neutral states. Id. The other
three options were neither strongly considered nor ultimately recommended. Id.
37
BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 132.
38
Security Council Letter, supra note 36.
30
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accountable for their crimes and discounted the possibility that a tribunal
would incite renewed violence.39 The U.N. Experts also articulated several
reasons for their opposition to a Cambodian court. First, Cambodians would
perceive purely domestic tribunals as biased.40 Based on evidence from
government representatives, non-governmental organizations, and
independent observers, the U.N. Experts concluded that Cambodians were
insufficiently confident in their judiciary.41 Second, independent of the
public’s perception, the Cambodian judiciary would not be institutionally
capable of effectively administering justice because of internal corruption
and judicial vulnerability to political influences.42 Additionally, the U.N.
Experts expressed concern over insufficient resources and the absence of a
competently staffed Cambodian judiciary.43
The U.N. Experts also considered and rejected the immediate
establishment of a TRC. They expressed concern over whether the
government would support a TRC,44 and whether a TRC could successfully
operate with a Cambodian criminal tribunal.45 Although they acknowledged
that a TRC could satisfy important societal interests, the U.N. Experts left
open the idea of establishing a Cambodian TRC for future discussion.46
Prime Minister Hun Sen vehemently opposed the U.N.’s suggestion
that an international tribunal try the Khmer Rouge.47 Although Hun Sen
conceded that the top leaders of the Khmer Rouge should face criminal
prosecution, he maintained that a Cambodian tribunal was the appropriate
forum for judging these perpetrators.48 A former Khmer Rouge member
himself,49 Hun Sen warned, “[I]f improperly and heedlessly conducted, the
trials of Khmer Rouge leaders would panic other former Khmer Rouge
officers and rank and file, who have already surrendered, into turning back
to the jungle and renewing the guerilla war in Cambodia.”50
39

Report of the Group of U.N. Experts, supra note 20, ¶ 108.
Id. ¶ 134.
41
Id.
42
Id. ¶¶ 133-34.
43
Id. ¶ 127.
44
The U.N. Experts noted that they were “not sure whether the Cambodian polity has yet achieved
the level of national reconciliation needed to permit the establishment of a commission.” Id. ¶ 204.
45
As the U.N. Experts stated, “if the two were carried out simultaneously and were focusing on the
same specific episodes, considerable difficulties might result for the fair conduct of trials, including the
tainting of evidence and the risk of inconsistent statements to the two bodies.” Id. ¶ 205.
46
Id. ¶¶ 203-08.
47
Hun Sen became Prime Minister of Cambodia in July 1998. Welcome to the Kingdom of
Cambodia: Premier’s Biography, http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/unisql1/egov/english/premier.biography.
html (last visited Feb. 12, 2007).
48
BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 133.
49
Report of the Group of U.N. Experts, supra note 20, ¶ 96.
50
Security Council Letter, supra note 36.
40
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Given Hun Sen’s staunch opposition to a purely international tribunal,
the U.N. ultimately abandoned this idea in 1999.51 Instead, the U.N.
reconsidered and subsequently recommended a joint tribunal composed of a
majority of international judges as a second-best alternative.52 In 2001,53 the
Cambodian government enacted the Law on the Establishment of the
Extraordinary Chambers (“CEC Law”).54 Instead of adopting the judicial
composition endorsed by the U.N., the CEC Law provides for a joint
tribunal with a majority of Cambodian judges.55 Though concerned with the
composition of this tribunal, in May 2003, the General Assembly agreed to
its establishment by approving the Draft Agreement between the U.N. and
the Royal Government of Cambodia (“Draft Agreement”).56 Though similar
to the CEC Law of 2001, the Draft Agreement was not identical.57 As a
result, in 2004, the Cambodian government amended the CEC Law to
conform to the Draft Agreement.58
C.

The Extraordinary Chambers Is a Compromise Institution Designed to
Address the Atrocities Committed by the Khmer Rouge

Cambodia’s recently amended CEC Law provides for a criminal
tribunal that will prosecute “suspects,” a term defined as senior Khmer
Rouge leaders and those most responsible for the mass killings committed
by the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979.59 The CEC is a hybrid
tribunal established within Cambodia’s existing judicial system.60 The
51

See BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 133-34.
See id. at 134.
53
Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Reach Kram No.
NS/RKM/0801/12, July 23, 2001, (Cambodia), (amended 2004), available at http://www.cambodia.
gov.kh/krt/ (follow law title hyperlink; then follow “2001 Law—English Translation by the Council of
Jurists” hyperlink).
54
Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, as amended, Reach Kram
No. NS/RKM/1004/006, Oct. 27, 2004, (Cambodia), available at http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/ (follow
law title hyperlink; then follow “as amended 27 Oct. 2004” hyperlink) [hereinafter CEC Law].
55
See id. ch. 3, art. 9.
56
Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Questions, Including Alternative Approaches for
Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, G.A. Res. 57/228, U.N.
GAOR, 57th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 109(b), U.N. Doc. A/57/806 (June 5, 2003).
57
For example, these laws contained different provisions on amnesty and witness protection. See
id.; see also CEC Law, supra note 54.
58
Id. The Cambodian government also ratified the Draft Agreement in 2004. See The Khmer
Rouge Trial Task Force, Chronology of Developments Relating to the KR Trial, http://www.cambodia.
gov.kh/krt/english/chrono.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
59
Throughout the CEC Law, “suspect” is used as shorthand for senior Cambodian leaders and those
who were most responsible for the Cambodian genocide. CEC Law, supra note 54, ch. 2, art. 2.
60
See id.
52
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tribunal will have one trial chamber, the Trial Chamber, and one appellate
chamber of final instance, the Supreme Court Chamber.61 Both chambers
will apply domestic and international law in their proceedings.62 In the
CEC, Cambodian and foreign judges, prosecutors, and investigating judges
will share center-stage.63 The Trial Chamber will include three Cambodian
and two foreign judges and the Supreme Court Chamber will house four
Cambodian judges and three international judges.64 One Cambodian and
foreign prosecutor will prepare indictments for the court and one Cambodian
and foreign investigating judge will collect evidence, hear witnesses, and
question suspects and victims.65 In order to secure a conviction, the CEC
Law requires, at the very least, a supermajority vote: an affirmative vote of
at least four judges in the lower chamber and the affirmative vote of at least
five judges in the appellate chamber.66 For those convicted, the CEC
imposes prison terms of five years to life imprisonment and permits the
confiscation of private property.67
Cambodians have suffered tremendously at the hands of the Khmer
Rouge. After decades of delay in holding the Khmer Rouge legally
accountable for their crimes, the CEC promises to bring justice to a country
ravaged by war. However, as this Comment argues, there is considerable
tension between the CEC and Article 52 of the Cambodian Constitution.
III.

ARTICLE 52 OF CAMBODIA’S CONSTITUTION FORBIDS CAMBODIAN
LAWS AND POLICIES THAT UNDERMINE TRUTH OR NATIONAL HEALING

Article 52 of the Cambodian Constitution provides that Cambodia
shall “adopt the policy of national reconciliation to ensure national
unity . . . .” 68 The meaning of this provision is vague and ambiguous.69
61

Id. ch. 3, art. 9.
The tribunal will apply international law where crimes are charged under international agreements,
such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. See id. ch. 2, art. 6.
Where crimes are charged under Cambodian penal law, the tribunal will apply Cambodia’s 1956 Penal
Code. Id. ch. 2, art. 3. In terms of procedure, the tribunal is to resort to Cambodian law. See id. ch. 6, art.
20; ch. 7, art. 23; ch. 10, art. 33. However, where “there is uncertainty regarding their interpretation or
application or if there is a question regarding” the consistency between domestic and international
standards, international standards can be consulted. Id. ch. 10, art. 33.
63
Id. ch. 3, art. 10; ch. 6, art. 16; ch. 7, art. 23.
64
Id. ch. 3, art. 9.
65
Id. ch. 6, art. 16; ch. 7, art. 23.
66
Id. ch. 5, art. 14.
67
Id. ch. 11, arts. 38-39.
68
In its entirety, Article 52 of the Cambodian Constitution states, “The Royal Government of
Cambodia shall protect the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia,
adopt the policy of national reconciliation to ensure national unity, and preserve the good national
traditions of the country. The Royal Government of Cambodia shall preserve and protect the law and
62

JANUARY 2008

CAMBODIA’S EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS

111

Cultural conceptions of national reconciliation strongly suggest that truth
and national healing are necessary principles implicit in the policy of
national reconciliation. More generally, Article 52’s legislative history and
intent support the proposition that truth and national healing are important
principles underlying the constitution. When viewed in light of the
constitution and related international agreements, “the policy of national
reconciliation” requires truth and national healing. As a result, Cambodian
laws and policies that undermine truth and national healing are in tension
with this constitutional provision.
A.

Buddhist Conceptions of Reconciliation Emphasize the Central Role
of “Truth” and “National Healing” in the Policy of National
Reconciliation

Political and social realities are essential for explaining Cambodia’s
use of customs and traditions in drafting and interpreting laws. First, many
judges in Cambodia are inadequately trained in the law.70 Accordingly,
judges often look to familiar traditions and customs when confronted with
legal interpretations.71 Second, Cambodian society is characterized by “the
weakness of the written word.”72 Instead of abiding by written rules,
Cambodians frequently revert to customary practices.73 Third, Theravada
Buddhism is the religion and culture of almost every Khmer, nearly ninety
percent of the Cambodian population.74 As a result of this religious
ensure public order and security. The State shall give priority to endeavours which improve the welfare
and standard of living of citizens.” KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, art. 52.
Analysis of Article 52 is virtually non-existent. Legal scholars have yet to interpret the meaning of Article
52’s requirement that the Cambodian government “adopt the policy of national reconciliation to ensure
national unity . . . .” Further, the Constitutional Council, the body entrusted with interpreting the
Cambodian Constitution, has yet to rule on this issue. Nonetheless, until Cambodian legal scholars or the
Cambodian Constitutional Council dictate otherwise, cultural and religious conceptions of national
reconciliation coupled with the constitution’s legislative history provide important insight and guidance.
69
Article 52 illustrates the general proposition that the Cambodian Constitution suffers from
ambiguous statements that are subject to conflicting interpretations. See THE COMPENDIUM OF CAMBODIAN
LAWS: VOLUME III LAWS AND REGULATIONS ADOPTED IN 1997-2000 i-25 (Sok Siphana ed., 2000)
[hereinafter CAMBODIAN LAWS].
70
See generally
Ministry of
Commerce:
Chapter
III
Publication of
Laws,
http://www.moc.gov.kh/laws_regulation/legal_reform_strategy-fnal_draft4.htm (last visited Mar. 14,
2007).
71
See CAMBODIAN LAWS, supra note 69, at i-26.
72
JENNAR, supra note 10, at 2. For example, “an agreement made in customary form is more
binding than a contract enumerating the obligations of the parties in writing.” Id.
73
See CAMBODIAN LAWS, supra note 69, at i-26.
74
Richard Kollodge et al., Country Studies: Cambodia—Buddhism, http://www.countrystudies.com/cambodia/buddhism.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2007); see also KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA
CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, art. 4 (declaring “Nation, Religion, King” as the motto of the Kingdom of
Cambodia).
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homogeneity, Cambodians share many common traditions that are integrated
into Cambodia’s legal framework without inciting social tension.75 Because
Cambodian judges often try cases “based on customs, traditions, conscience
and equity,”76 analyzing “the policy of national reconciliation to ensure
national unity . . . .” in light of Buddhist principles is essential for
understanding Article 52.77
Buddhist teachings reveal that the truth is an essential component of
reconciliation.78 Truth is learning “why things were as they were and to
learn who [Cambodians] should blame.”79 Truth is fact.80 Buddhism
teaches Cambodians to see the truth through the truth.81 Though the truth
cannot change the past, it can provide lessons for the future.82
Healing also plays a significant role in the Buddhist conception of
reconciliation.83 For example, revered Buddhist monk Yos Hut Khemacaro
emphasizes a “middle path” to reconciliation.84 It is a model that advocates
compassion and non-violence to advance political processes, a model that
reflects the Buddhist way: “neither joining the fight nor hiding from it.”85
Rather than preclude social action, the “middle path” provides for the
resolution of political problems beyond “the adversarial framework implicit
in partisanship” and by doing so, “can help the Cambodian people to find
their own peace.”86
Finally, Buddhism also supports the notion that the principles of truth
and healing are consistent with ensuring national unity. According to Yos
Hut Khemacaro, Cambodians cannot begin to “befriend one another, have
pity on each other, and rebuild the country toward prosperity” until national
healing occurs and Cambodians find happiness.87 By allowing Cambodians
75

See CAMBODIAN LAWS, supra note 69, at i-26.
For example, although Article 47 provides that children have a duty to take good care of their
aging patents in accord with Khmer tradition, “the meaning of ‘good care’ is defined by Buddhist and
Khmer tradition and not by the Constitution.” Id.
77
KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, art. 52.
78
Jaya Ramji, Reclaiming Cambodian History: The Case for a Truth Commission, 24 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 137, 143 (2000).
79
Kayalan Sann & Kannitha Kim Keo, Interview with the Venerable Yos Hut Khemacarao, in
SEARCHING FOR THE TRUTH 32, 36 (Youk Chhang & Wynne Cougill eds., 2002).
80
Id.
81
Id. at 35.
82
See id.
83
See Vannath Chea, Reconciliation in Cambodia: Politics, Culture, and Religion, in
RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT 49, 49-53 (David Bloomfield et al. eds., 2003), available at
http://www.idea.int/publications/reconciliation/upload/reconciliation_full.pdf.
84
Id. at 52.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
See Sann & Keo, supra note 79, at 32.
76
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to learn how and why the genocide occurred, the truth will end arguments
arising from ignorance of the past.88 Once truth is learned, Cambodians can
calm themselves and grow closer as a nation.89 Thus, Buddhism not only
supports that truth and national healing are principles implicit in the policy
of national reconciliation, it also teaches that such principles are essential “to
ensure national unity . . . .”90
B.

Traditional Methods of Constitutional Interpretation Support That
“Truth” and “National Healing” Are Important Principles
Underlying the Cambodian Constitution

Cambodian courts have yet to explicitly endorse the use of legislative
history and intent to interpret ambiguous Cambodian legal provisions.
Nonetheless, an analysis of recent opinions rendered by the Cambodian
Constitutional Council,91 the body entrusted with interpreting the
Cambodian Constitution,92 reveals that Cambodian courts commonly use
legislative history and intent to interpret ambiguous legal provisions. In one
2003 opinion, the Constitutional Council used legislative intent and National
Assembly minutes to interpret a legal provision in dispute.93 In yet another
opinion, the Constitutional Council used “the spirit of the text for guidance”
rather than the literal text itself.94
The preamble to the Cambodian Constitution sheds significant light
on the intent95 of its framers96 and in doing so, supports the conclusion that
88

See id.
See id.
90
KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, art. 52.
91
Opinions published by the Constitutional Council have thus far been extremely limited.
CAMBODIAN LAWS, supra note 69, at i-27.
92
See Constitutional Council of Cambodia, http://www.ccc.gov.kh/english/index.php (last visited
Mar. 21, 2007).
93
In interpreting the meaning of paragraph 1 of Article 124 N of the Law on the Amendment of the
Law on the Elections of the Members of the National Assembly, the court stated, “[F]ollowing the
precisions of the Ministry of Interior, the drafter of the bill on the Elections of the Members of the National
Assembly, the idea is to empower the National Electoral Committee (NEC) to impose fine.” Constitutional
Council of Cambodia, N 058/009/2003 CC.D. (Oct. 16, 2003), available at http://www.ccc.gov.kh/
english/dec/2003/dec_009.html. Additionally, the court noted, “[F]ollowing the minutes of the debates at
the National Assembly . . . , there were [sic] no proposal to modify the initial idea concerning the draft
articles 124 N and 124 old on this issue.” Id.
94
The Council looked to the “spirit” of the text, or purpose, in rendering its ruling on the
constitutionality of the ordinary or extraordinary plenary session of the National Assembly, paragraph 1 of
Article 76 and Article 95 of Chapter 7 of the Cambodian Constitution. Constitutional Council of
Cambodia, N 054/005/2003 CC.D. (July 22, 2003), available at http://www.ccc.gov.kp/dec/
2003/dec_005.html.
95
“The Preamble is a key to opening the collective mind of the Constitution’s makers that may
reveal the general purposes for which they made several provisions in the Constitution. The Preamble
contains, in a nutshell, the ideals and aspirations of the people as identified by the founding fathers of the
89
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truth and national healing are important principles underlying the
constitution. It states, “We the people of Cambodia, . . . having been
weakened terribly, . . . determined to unite for . . . the restoration of
Cambodia into an Island of Peace . . . and having high responsibility for the
nation’s future destiny of moving toward perpetual progress, development,
prosperity, and glory, . . . inscribe the folling as the Consitution of the
Kingdom of Cambodia[.]”97 The preamble reveals that the constitution was
written with the intent of helping Cambodians move forward from their
tragic past. A country that has been “weakened terribly” can only attain
progress, prosperity, and glory with healing;98 thus, the preamble’s reference
to these goals suggests that the constitution was intended to encourage such
emotional reparation. Additionally, scholars recognize that trauma produces
“corrosive enduring effects,” which can only disappear once the truth of
what occurred, how it occurred, and why it occurred emerges.99
The history of the Cambodian Constitution also supports the
conclusion that a desire to uncover the truth influenced its drafting.
Cambodia’s modern constitution is a product of the 1991 Paris
Agreements100 and the subsequent deployment of the UNTAC.101 Among
the Paris Agreements, the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (“Political Agreement”)102 advanced
many principles that were later incorporated into Cambodia’s 1993
Constitution.103
Article 15 of the Political Agreement explicitly states, “Cambodia
undertakes to take effective measures to ensure that the policies and
practices of the past shall never be allowed to return . . . .”104 The preamble
Constitution.” Asian Human Rights Commission, Cambodia Human Rights: Preamble, http://cambodia.
ahrchk.net/mainfile.php/legal_reforms/462 (last visited Mar. 31, 2007).
96
The Constituent Assembly is the body that drafted and adopted the New Constitution of the
Kingdom of Cambodia in 1993. JENNAR, supra note 10, at 7.
97
KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at pmbl.
98
Id.
99
Robert I. Rotberg, Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation, in
TRUTH V. JUSTICE 3, 3 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000).
100
The 1991 Paris Agreements include the following four documents: the Final Act of the Paris
Conference on Cambodia; the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia
Conflict; the Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability,
Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia; and the Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
of Cambodia. Steven R. Ratner, The Cambodian Settlement Agreements, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (1993).
101
JENNAR, supra note 10, at 7.
102
Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Conflict in Cambodia, Oct. 23, 1991,
available at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/cambodia/agree_comppol_10231991.html#part3 [hereinafter
Cambodia Paris Agreement].
103
Ratner, supra note 100, at 9.
104
Cambodia Paris Agreement, supra note 102, art. 15.
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to the Political Agreement parallels this language.105 Though not prescribing
particular measures for addressing the Khmer Rouge atrocities, the text of
Article 15 and the preamble of the Political Agreement indicate that the
constitution was drafted by individuals who recognized the need for
effective measures to deter the reemergence of genocide. Given the
difficulty of deterring future abuses without first understanding past
abuses,106 Article 15 suggests that uncovering the truth must be an essential
element of such a measure. As one scholar emphasizes, “[I]f societies are to
prevent recurrences of past atrocities . . . societies must understand—at the
deepest possible levels—what occurred and why.”107
Cultural conceptions of national reconciliation coupled with the
Cambodian Constitution’s legislative history and intent suggest that Article
52 prohibits the Cambodian government from pursuing laws and policies
that undermine truth and healing. However, limitations on the CEC’s power
to hold the Khmer Rouge responsible for its crimes place this tribunal in
tension with the requirements of Article 52.
IV.

LIMITATIONS ON THE CEC WEAKEN ITS ABILITY TO HOLD THE KHMER
ROUGE ACCOUNTABLE

The CEC suffers from several limitations that challenge its ability to
hold the Khmer Rouge fully accountable for its crimes and as a result, hinder
the tribunal’s capacity to bring justice to Cambodia.108 First, the CEC Law
fails to ensure the impartiality and the independence of the CEC. Second,
public participation in CEC proceedings is severely limited. Finally, the
CEC’s restrictive personal jurisdiction undermines its purpose.

105
The preamble to the Political Agreement provides, in part, “Recognizing that Cambodia’s tragic
recent history requires special measures to assure protection of human rights, and the non-return to the
policies and practices of the past . . . .” Id.
106
As scholar Robert I. Rotberg argues, “[I[f societies are to prevent recurrences of past
atrocities….societies must understand—at the deepest possible levels—what occurred and why.” Rotberg,
supra note 99, at 3.
107
Id.
108
Though the tribunal suffers from many legal and political limitations, this section will only focus
on those CEC limitations that are relevant to the relationship between the tribunal and Article 52. For the
purposes of this Comment, the CEC’s limitations are those characteristics that undermine truth and/or
national healing, principles that are implicit in the principle of national reconciliation under Article 52.

116

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 17 NO. 1

A.

The Law Establishing the Extraordinary Chambers Fails to
Adequately Guarantee the Impartiality and Independence of the
Tribunal

The CEC Law’s failure to ensure the independence and impartiality of
Cambodia’s criminal tribunal undermines its legitimacy and ultimately its
constitutionality. The CEC Law’s provisions on the composition and
selection of tribunal officials have garnered sharp criticism emphasizing the
CEC’s vulnerability to political influence and corruption.109
The composition of the CEC reflects the CEC Law’s failure to ensure
impartiality. Rather than possess a majority of international judges, the CEC
consists of a majority of Cambodian judges in both the trial and appellate
chambers.110 Given that the Khmer Rouge atrocities were committed by
Cambodians, against Cambodians, and on Cambodian soil, the ideal
composition for ensuring judicial impartiality requires that the CEC possess
a majority of international judges. In countries where the rule of law is weak
and judges are highly susceptible to political bias, it is not unusual for hybrid
courts to have a majority of international judges.111 This judicial
composition prevents inexperienced or politically influenced domestic
judges from hijacking judicial processes.112
By possessing a majority of Cambodian judges, the CEC “fails to
mitigate the risks of utilizing Cambodian judges by allowing these judges to
exercise stranglehold control over the tribunal’s decisions.”113 According to
the U.N. SG, “There still remains doubt . . . regarding the credibility of the
Extraordinary Chambers, given the precarious state of the judiciary in
Cambodia.”114 Reports on the dire state of the Cambodian legal and judicial
system are abundant.115 As the U.N. Experts noted in their report, “given the
109

Michael Lieberman, Salvaging the Remains: The Khmer Rouge Tribunal on Trial, 186 MIL. L.
REV. 164, 173 (2005).
110
Article 9 states, “The Trial Chamber shall be an Extraordinary Chamber composed of five
professional judges, of whom three are Cambodian judges with one as president, and two foreign Judges.”
CEC Law, supra note 54, ch. 2, art. 9. This article further provides that the “[t]he Supreme Court
Chamber, which shall be an Extraordinary Chamber composed of seven judges, of whom four are
Cambodian judges with one as president, and three as foreign judges.” Id.
111
In part, the hybrid courts of East Timor and Sierra Leone possessed a majority of international
judges for this very reason. See Linton, supra note 6, at 204, 234.
112
See Scott Luftgass, Crossroads in Cambodia: The United Nation’s Responsibility to Withdraw
Involvement from the Establishment of a Cambodian Tribunal to Prosecute the Khmer Rouge, 90 VA. L.
REV. 893, 936 (2004).
113
Id.
114
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on Khmer Rouge Trials, 1, delivered to
the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/57/769 (Mar. 31, 2003).
115
Suzannah Linton, Safeguarding the Independence and the Impartiality of the Cambodian
Extraordinary Chambers, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 327, 329 (2006). She further explains that the “reasons for
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ravages experienced by the Cambodian legal system over the last generation,
it might be difficult for the United Nations to locate a sufficiently trained
jurist who would have the expertise necessary to participate on such a
panel.”116 Even if such a person was found, he or she would likely
encounter significant political pressure to rule a particular way.117 In the
worst case scenario for the CEC, three international judges would find a
former Khmer Rouge leader guilty of genocide and four Cambodian judges
presiding over the Supreme Court Chamber of the CEC would find this
“suspect” not guilty despite the existence of substantial evidence of guilt.118
With no supermajority to convict in the Supreme Court Chamber,119 the
CEC’s appellate chamber of final review,120 the Khmer Rouge leader would
be set free.121
Similarly, the process of selecting the CEC’s most important officials
has been criticized for effectively placing power in the hands of biased
political actors.122 The CEC Law provides that the Supreme Council of the
Magistracy (“Council”)123 shall select the CEC’s judges,124 prosecutors,125
and investigating judges.126 Under Article 11 of the CEC Law, the Council
must appoint the CEC’s seven Cambodian judges to the tribunal (three to the
trial chamber and four to the appellate chamber).127 Whereas the U.N. SG
nominates and the Council appoints the foreign prosecutor, the Council
selects the Cambodian prosecutors from a pool of professional Cambodian
judges.128 Article 26 provides that the Council will also select the
the abysmal state of Cambodia's legal and judicial system are highly complex, and derive from history,
culture, socio-political conditions and basic human and infrastructural capacity.” Id.
116
Report of the Group of U.N. Experts, supra note 20, ¶ 157.
117
Id. ¶ 158.
118
Ernestine E. Meijer, The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for Prosecuting
Crimes Committed by the Khmer Rouge: Jurisdiction, Organization, and Procedure of an Internationalized
National Tribunal, in INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST TIMOR, KOSOVO, AND
CAMBODIA, supra note 19, at 207, 220. CEC Law employs the term “suspect” to refer to senior Cambodian
leaders and those who were most responsible for the Cambodian genocide. CEC Law, supra note 54, ch. 2,
art. 2.
119
Id. ch. 5, art. 14.
120
Id. ch. 2, art. 9.
121
See Meijer, supra note 118, at 220.
122
See Linton, supra note 115, at 332.
123
The Supreme Council of the Magistracy is the Cambodian body that is constitutionally entrusted
with the task of ensuring the independence of Cambodia’s judiciary as well as disciplining delinquent
judges where necessary. It is a body that is chaired by the king. KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA CONSTITUTION,
supra note 10, arts. 113-15.
124
CEC Law, supra note 54, ch. 4, art. 11.
125
Id. ch. 6, art. 18.
126
Id. ch. 7, art. 26.
127
Id. ch. 4, art. 11.
128
Id. ch. 6, art. 18.
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Cambodian co-investigating judges “from among Cambodian professional
judges.”129
The constitution entrusts the Council with ensuring the impartiality of
Cambodia’s judiciary.130 At odds with this ideal is the Council’s strong
connection to Cambodia’s ruling political party, the People’s Party.131
Perceived as heavily biased, the Council is more likely to be concerned with
protecting party lines than with maintaining the integrity of Cambodia’s
judiciary.132 Although the CEC Law requires that judges, co-prosecutors,
and co-investigators “be independent in the performance of their functions,
and shall not accept or seek any instructions from any government or any
other source,”133 this result is doubtful.134
The political will to alter the judicial composition of the CEC or
reform the Council is notably absent in Cambodia. Despite the U.N.’s
insistence that the CEC possess a majority of international judges, Prime
Minister Hun Sen consistently refused and was ultimately successful in
securing U.N. approval for a tribunal with a majority of Cambodian
judges.135 As a result, the CEC currently possesses a judicial composition
that undermines the impartiality of the CEC.136
B.

Cambodian Participation and Involvement in the Extraordinary
Chambers Is Limited

The CEC Law severely limits the scope of the Cambodian public’s
participation in the Khmer Rouge trials. First, although many Cambodians
have suffered severely at the hands of the Khmer Rouge, the CEC Law
provides victims only a minimal role in the trials.137 The only role reserved
for victims is an opportunity to appeal an unfavorable decision to the
129

Id. ch. 11, art. 26.
KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, art. 113.
131
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2001: CAMBODIA 176 (2001), available at
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/print/full/asia.pdf.
132
See Linton, supra note 115, at 332. “Major reform is required of this body . . . . It must be
depoliticized and its membership must reflect the separation of powers (specifically, the Minister of Justice
must not be a member).” Id.
133
CEC Law, supra note 54, ch. 4, art. 10.
134
Its current composition does not reflect the principle of separation of powers. Provisions
providing for clear, transparent, fair, and internationally-accepted criteria for appointing judges are
currently lacking. See Linton, supra note 115, at 329.
135
See BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 133-35.
136
See supra, Part IV.A.
137
For example, the CEC Law gives the co-prosecutors the exclusive role of determining who should
face prosecution. This means that a Cambodian victim cannot bring a criminal action against his or her
Khmer Rouge aggressor. See CEC Law, supra note 54, ch. 6, art. 16. Additionally, the CEC Law provides
no formal avenue for victims to participate in the trials. See CEC Law, supra note 54.
130
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Supreme Court Chamber.138 Allowing excessive victim participation in
CEC proceedings could prove destabilizing. Enabling victims to determine
subjects for prosecution could result in revenge prosecutions, and providing
victims a greater role in the proceedings, could produce significant structural
and normative problems.139 Nonetheless, as it currently stands, the CEC
Law provides insufficient victim participation. The CEC Law allows
victims only a minor role in the trial process: the power to appeal a decision
to the CEC’s court of final instance. Victims are not offered a formal role of
intervention at particular stages in an existing prosecution.140
Second, the Cambodian public has no democratic control over the
selection of the prosecuting attorney. Under the CEC Law, the Council, not
the public, is responsible for appointing the seven141 Cambodian judges,142
the Cambodian prosecutor,143 and the Cambodian co-investigating judge
who will preside over the tribunal.144 However, the Council, a body
established to help the King satisfy his constitutional duty of ensuring the
impartiality of the Cambodian judiciary, serves at the will of the King, not at
the the will of the people.145 Additionally, because members of the Council
are not elected in a public or transparent manner, the process for selecting
Cambodian officials for the CEC is even further removed from the people.146
Any attempt to provide greater public involvement in the CEC faces
significant political and institutional barriers. Continued calls to reform the
Council remain unanswered.147 Additionally, limited public involvement
and participation is not unique to the CEC. As one scholar notes, “[t]rials
focus on perpetrators, not victims” and they “afford no role in their process

138

Id. ch. 10, art. 36.
Jonathan Doak, Victims’ Rights in Criminal Trials: Prospects for Participation, 32 J.L. & SOC’Y
294, 297 (2005).
140
Participation in criminal prosecutions varies among legal systems and countries. For example,
“Many continental jurisdictions permit victims to join the criminal action instituted by the state as
‘subsidiary prosecutors’ or through an ‘adhesion’ procedure.” Id. at 297-98. In contrast, victim
participation has been less substantial in common law countries. Id. at 296. See also United Nations
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A. Res. 40/34,
Annex, U.N. Doc A/RES/40/34 (Nov. 29, 1985) (establishing that “the views and concerns of
victims . . . be presented and considered at appropriate stages of the proceedings”).
141
Of the seven Cambodian judges, three preside at the trial court level and four preside at the
appellate level. CEC Law, supra note 54, ch. 3, art. 9.
142
Id. ch. 4, art. 11.
143
Id. ch. 6, art. 18.
144
Id. ch. 7, art. 26.
145
KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, arts. 113, 115.
146
See Linton, supra note 115, at 332-33 (noting that there is “a complete absence of transparency” in
the selection of local judges).
147
Id.
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or content for bystanders . . . .”148 To some extent, all criminal tribunals,
including the CEC, suffer from this limitation. Accordingly, Cambodia must
look beyond criminal prosecutions to address this limitation of the CEC.
C.

The Personal Jurisdiction of the Tribunal Only Allows for Limited
Prosecutions

The personal jurisdiction of the CEC is unduly limited to “suspects,”
“senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most
responsible for the crimes and serious violations” of the relevant laws.149 As
a result of the CEC Law’s failure to clearly and narrowly define “senior
leaders” and “most responsible,” the jurisdiction of the tribunal is not only
constrained by a literal interpretation of these terms; it is also constrained by
the restrictive meanings to which the tribunal has accorded them.150
The literal interpretation of “senior leaders” and “most responsible”
limits the jurisdiction of the CEC to a few individuals, those most
responsible for the atrocities committed at the hands of the Khmer Rouge. 151
As one scholar postulates:
The definitions “senior leaders” and “most responsible”
together with the available evidence, would determine how
many of these could be legally targeted for serious
investigation, but my (very rough) guess is that no more than 60
cases would fit into these categories, including perhaps 10
senior leaders and 50 of their most responsible
subordinates . . . .152
Given available evidence, sixty individuals could conceivably face
investigation under these definitions.153 Nonetheless, not all of them would
necessarily face prosecution.154
Limiting prosecutions to the most
responsible senior Khmer Rouge leaders allows hundreds of local Khmer
Rouge who played a lesser, though significant, role in the atrocities to
escape punishment.155
148
Martha Minow, The Hope for Healing: What Can Truth Commissions Do?, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE,
supra note 99, at 235, 238.
149
CEC Law, supra note 54, ch. 2, art. 2.
150
See Steve Heder, The Senior Leader and Those Most Responsible, in JUSTICE INITIATIVES: THE
EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS 53, 54 (Steven Humphreys & David Berry eds., 2006).
151
Id. at 55.
152
Id.
153
See id.
154
Id.
155
See id. at 54-55.
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As a result of its failure to more precisely define “senior leaders” and
“most responsible,”156 the CEC Law leaves the scope of personal jurisdiction
vulnerable to the tribunal’s overly restrictive readings of these terms.157
Heder argues that the tribunal has already explicitly articulated an intention
to limit its prosecutions to only a handful of Khmer Rouge members.158
Additionally, the tribunal has made such intentions implicitly known.159 To
illustrate, as of October 2007, the CEC has charged only five Khmer Rouge
leaders.160 Additionally, estimates do not anticipate more than seven Khmer
Rouge leaders facing trial, though a broader reading of “senior leaders”
could encompass more.161 Though “senior leaders” and “those who were
most responsible” could include other Khmer Rouge members “who should,
according to a literal interpretation of the law, be candidates for
prosecution,” the court will likely limit prosecutions to “the leading cadre of
the [Communist Pary of Kampuchea] central security office” and “the
Phnom Penh torture center.”162
Although the most immediate response to the CEC’s limited personal
jurisdiction could be to broaden those subject to prosecution, this reform
faces several obstacles. The tribunal has already articulated a preference to
limit CEC prosecutions.163 Additionally, limited prosecutions are inherent in
the very structure of criminal trials.164 Where the charge is systematic
human rights violations, prosecutors can only prosecute a limited number of
defendants and crimes due to time and budget constraints.165
The CEC is an institution that suffers from limitations that challenge
its ability to promote justice and ensure accountability. Although many of its
limitations are shared by criminal tribunals in general, the CEC’s limitations

156
For example, to prevent the tribunal’s overly restrictive interpretation of these terms, the CEC Law
could more precisely define “senior leaders” in terms of rank and Khmer Rouge position, or the CEC Law
could define “most responsible” in terms of the number of crimes committed.
157
See Heder, supra note 150, at 54.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Seth Mydans, Khmer Rouge Hearing Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/21/world/asia/22cambo.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.
161
See Heder, supra note 150, at 55-56.
162
Id. at 54.
163
See id. at 54.
164
To illustrate, as of January 2004, ninety-one accused have appeared in proceedings before the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and forty-six accused individuals have been
tried since the tribunal’s inception. BEIGBEDER, supra note 7, at 76. As of November 2007, the Special
Court for Sierra Leone indicted eleven perpetrators since the tribunal’s inception. However, one case was
dropped after the perpetrator’s death. About the Special Court for Sierra Leone, http://www.scsl.org/about.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
165
See Minow, supra note 148, at 238.
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are particularly troublesome given Cambodia’s obligations under Article
52.166
V.

THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL LIMITATIONS OF THE CEC CONFLICT WITH
ARTICLE 52 BY UNDERMINING TRUTH AND NATIONAL HEALING

Scholars have referred to the CEC as an institution of transitional
justice intended to bring national reconciliation to the people of
Cambodia.167 Nonetheless, as the Cambodian government’s primary legal
response to the Khmer Rouge genocide, the CEC undermines Article 52 of
the constitution by weakening truth and healing, principles that are implicit
in the “policy of reconciliation to ensure national unity . . . .”168 Not only
will the CEC Law’s failure to guarantee the impartiality of the CEC
undermine truth, this limitation will also inspire “a resurgence of resentment,
guilt, mourning, depression, and even a desire for revenge” among
Cambodians.169 Additionally, because of limited public involvement and
constrained personal jurisdiction, these trials will open old wounds without
providing closure.
A.

The CEC Law’s Failure to Guarantee the Legitimacy and Impartiality
of the Trials Will Taint the Truth and Generate Dissatisfaction

Legitimacy and impartiality are essential to fostering the truth and
justice that will help provide constitutionally mandated national
reconciliation in Cambodia. However, as discussed above, the CEC Law’s
provisions on judicial composition and selection of tribunal officials call into
question the independence and objectivity of the CEC.170 The CEC’s
questionable impartiality undermines both truth and healing.
If prosecutions are conducted in an unfair and biased manner or
perceived as such, they are unlikely to uncover the truth, the reality of what
happened, and why it happened.171 Instead, any truth that is revealed will be
tainted by perceptions of the tribunal as dishonest, biased, or highly
politicized.
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Additionally, the political manipulation of CEC proceedings has led
many Cambodians to question whether the CEC can deliver “meaningful
justice for past atrocities.”172 Without confidence that the judicial process
will provide justice, Cambodians cannot move forward by making amends
with the past.173 The CEC will leave Cambodian society in a state of
dissatisfaction and distrust, the very elements that run contrary to national
healing. Unless the CEC satisfies Cambodian perceptions of justice, the
tribunal will carry the stigma of politicizing the genocide rather than
accounting for it.174
B.

Limited Cambodian Involvement Will Undermine Healing by
Alienating Victims

By not actively involving victims in the process,175 the CEC will only
alienate them.176 Providing victims a role in the process gives them a “sense
of empowerment” and “may bring them a step closer to healing and
rehabilitation.”177 Victim participation is essential for combating “the sense
of powerlessness” that victims inevitably feel during proceedings.178 In
addition, the CEC Law’s failure to provide victims a more formal role in the
trials will undoubtedly fail to enhance their satisfaction with the process.179
The lack of democratic control over the selection of the CEC
prosecutor will also weaken Cambodian healing. To some extent, all
Cambodians are victims of the Khmer Rouge atrocities.180 The fact that the
CEC Law entrusts the Council, an unelected body that is responsible to the
King,181 with selecting the CEC prosecutor will result in Cambodians feeling
as though they have no say or control over the process.182 Providing victims
a greater role in selecting the CEC prosecutor is also important for bringing
greater legitimacy to the criminal trials.183 As discussed above, public
172
Kek Galabru, Reconciliation in International Justice: Lessons from Other Tribunals, in JUSTICE
INITIATIVES: EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS, supra note 150, at 151, 153.
173
See id. at 157.
174
Id.
175
As Susan SaCouto argues, this goal is “particularly significant in the context of Cambodia, where
justice for the families of an estimated 1.7 million people who perished under the leadership of the Khmer
Rouge has effectively been put on hold for over 25 years.” SaCouto, Victims and Witnesses, in JUSTICE
INITIATIVES: EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS, supra note 150, at 60, 60.
176
Galabru, supra note 172, at 152.
177
SaCouto, supra note 175, at 60-62.
178
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179
See id.
180
See SaCouto, supra note 175, at 60.
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Linton, supra note 115, at 332.
182
Id. at 60-61.
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perceptions of the CEC proceedings as illegitimate will only result in distrust
and dissatisfaction with the process.184
As a result of the detrimental impact that victim non-involvement
plays in emotional rehabilitation, in recent years, a trend towards increased
victim participation in criminal proceedings has emerged.185 Since the mid1980s, “the interests of victims have come to play a more prominent role in
the formulation of policy in both domestic and international criminal justice
systems.”186 Recognizing the need for greater victim participation, in 1985,
the United Nations called on states to allow “the views and concerns of
victims to be presented and considered at appropriate stages of the
proceedings.”187 This emerging trend reinforces the importance of victim
participation and involvement in criminal proceedings.
C.

Limited Prosecutions Will Undermine National Healing by Restricting
Truth and Justice

The limited and imprecisely defined scope of the CEC’s personal
jurisdiction also undermines national reconciliation. Read narrowly, the
CEC law essentially grants lower-level leaders of the Khmer Rouge de facto
amnesty for their crimes.188 In reality, these were the individuals who
carried out, planned, or directed the the Khmer Rouge atrocities.189
Accordingly, this effective grant of amnesty destroys the possibility of full
reconciliation.
If the tribunal’s restrictive interpretations of personal jurisdiction are
motivated “by political factors, rather than impartial application of the text
of the [CEC] Law,” the trials are unlikely to add to the truth.190 Rather,
improperly conducted, the Khmer Rouge trials will undermine healing.191
Additionally, the CEC’s limited prosecutions are likely to produce
dissatisfaction and discontent with the process, results that run contrary to
the requirements of Article 52 of the constitution. Truth-telling is one of the
most important moral virtues in Buddhist cultures.192 Almost all of the
Cambodians surveyed in a recent study revealed a desire to know the truth of
184
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what happened during the Khmer Rouge’s reign.193 Many victims want to
know who killed their family members.194 They have an expectation that the
trials will bring them truth and justice.195 Many Cambodians also have the
expectation that the lower-level Khmer Rouge members who killed their
mother or brother will face prosecution.196 Nonetheless, because of the
CEC’s limited personal jurisdiction, the tribunal will unlikely satisfy
Cambodian expectations for comprehensive truth and justice. Accordingly,
the CEC’s limited prosecutions will likely result in disappointment and
despair.
Despite arguments to the contrary, the limited personal jurisdiction of
the CEC will not facilitate national reconciliation. In their report, the U.N.
Experts argued that “a reopening of the events through criminal trials on a
massive scale would impede the national reconciliation so important for
Cambodia.”197 Though unwilling to set a minimum or maximum, they
estimated that twenty to thirty Khmer Rouge would face prosecution for
their crimes.198 This number is far greater than the handful of perpetrators
likely to be prosecuted.199 Expanding the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction
to hundreds or thousands of Cambodians could prove socially destabilizing.
Yet, limiting prosecutions to only a handful of “senior” Khmer Rouge
leaders and those “most responsible” for the atrocities may prove far more
detrimental to reconciliation. Unduly restrictive personal jurisdiction cannot
establish a foundation for reconciliation. Additionally, though excessive
prosecutions can prove harmful to social stability and reconciliation,
“[c]ircumscribing investigation and prosecutions to an excessive degree
could undermine the tribunal’s credibility with the public and reinforce a
sense of impunity rather than dismantling it.”200
The CEC possesses limitations that are in tension with Article 52 of
the Cambodian Constitution. These include questionable impartiality,
limited public participation, and restricted personal jurisdiction. However,
Cambodia should not eliminate its criminal tribunal. Not only will
prosecuting several senior Khmer Rouge leaders bring some sense of justice
to Cambodia, the CEC will also help bring Cambodia into compliance with
193
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the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (“Genocide
Convention”).201
Rather than replace the CEC, Cambodia should
supplement its tribunal with informal mechanisms of transitional justice.
VI.

CAMBODIA SHOULD IMPLEMENT INFORMAL INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES
TO SUPPLEMENT THE CEC RATHER THAN ESTABLISH A TRC

Supplementing the CEC with informal institutional responses will
help satisfy Cambodia’s obligations under the Genocide Convention as well
as bring the CEC into greater compliance with Article 52.202
“It is generally accepted that ‘[a] single institution on its own is
unlikely to bring about a peaceful, stable, and restored nation.’”203
Supplementing the CEC with a Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(“TRC”) could help address the weaknesses of Cambodia’s tribunal.
However, not only is a TRC prohibitively expensive, Cambodia lacks the
necessary political will for such a commission. Thus, the Cambodian
government should promote more economically and politically feasible
programs such as town meetings and mental health counseling to
supplement the CEC.
A.

Given Its Accession to the Genocide Convention, Cambodia Should
Supplement Rather than Replace the CEC

Cambodia should not eliminate its criminal prosecutions given its
duty to prosecute perpetrators charged with genocide under the Genocide
Convention.204 Cambodia acceded to the Genocide Convention on October
14, 1950.205 The Genocide Convention explicitly requires Cambodia to
prosecute criminal perpetrators charged with genocide.206 As the convention
201
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states, “Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts,” such as
conspiracy to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity
in genocide, “shall be punished.”207 This provision further provides that
such persons shall be tried in a domestic or international court.208
To the extent that it is a tribunal that prosecutes “suspects” charged
with genocide, the CEC helps satisfy Cambodia’s obligations under the
Genocide Convention.209 Even though the CEC suffers from limitations that
undermine national reconciliation, the appropriate response is not
abandoning Cambodia’s criminal prosecutions. Rather, the appropriate
response is supplementing the CEC.
B.

A TRC Is an Institution That Has the Potential to Promote National
Reconciliation

A TRC is an institution established to investigate past human rights
violations.210 TRCs differ greatly from criminal tribunals such as the CEC in
both purpose and design. They provide a forum in which victims can tell
their stories, share their traumas, and confront those who have wronged
them.211 These proceedings frequently conclude with published reports that
provide guidance for preventing future abuses.212 Together, the purposes and
features of a TRC support its potential to promote national reconciliation.
The primary purpose of the TRC is to establish the truth by resolving
unanswered questions about past human rights violations.213 TRCs allow
societies to learn what was previously unknown.214 In a TRC, criminals are
brought to light and victims learn what happened to them and to their loved
ones.
A TRC possesses institutional features that give victims their “civil
and human dignity by providing them with an opportunity to tell their own
stories of victimhood.”215 It provides a forum for victims and their families
to discuss the abuses suffered, thus creating a cathartic environment in
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which decades of anguish, grief, fear, and hate are released.216 As opposed
to a criminal trial, the primary focus of a TRC is on victims and their
stories.217
C.

Significant Political and Economic Barriers Hinder the Establishment
of a TRC for Cambodia

Though a TRC is designed to promote national reconciliation, the
establishment of a TRC is not appropriate for all countries. Rather, to be
successful in realizing the goal of truth and reconciliation, a TRC requires
government support and proper funding.218 Given the absence of these
important factors, a Cambodian TRC is impractical.
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen has expressed clear disapproval
of a Cambodian TRC.219 Hun Sen has also refused to accept a truth
commission for lesser members of the Khmer Rouge.220 While not explicit,
Hun Sen’s opposition to a TRC likely stems from his fear that a TRC will
instill panic in former Khmer Rouge officers and produce further societal
tensions.221
Hun Sen’s concerns could be addressed by providing
perpetrators conditional amnesty—truth in exchange for freedom from
prosecution—as was implemented by South Africa’s TRC. Nonetheless, the
fact that Hun Sen rejected a TRC for Cambodia after studying South Africa’s
TRC makes this possibility unlikely.222
A TRC also comes with significant cost. For example, whereas the
TRC in East Timor required approximately 3.8 million dollars to subsidize
its two year mandate,223 Sierra Leone’s TRC cost 5 million.224 Cambodia’s
216
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ability to fund a TRC is doubtful given that Cambodia has yet to secure full
funding for its CEC. Although the U.N. will pay the expenses of the CEC’s
international staff and personnel, Cambodia is responsible for the expenses
and salaries of all Cambodian personnel.225 The CEC is expected to cost
approximately 56.3 million dollars for three years of operation.226 However,
as of March 2006, Cambodia still lacked millions in tribunal funds.227
D.

Cambodia Should Look to Informal Mechanisms of Transitional
Justice to Address the Tension Between the CEC and Article 52

Rather than establish a TRC that is neither politically nor
economically feasible, Cambodia should sponsor more feasible programs
that can promote national reconciliation. These programs should include
town meetings and greater access to mental health services to aid victims of
the Khmer Rouge.228
Because town meetings serve different purposes and take different
forms, Cambodian town meetings could be structured to provide truth and
healing without the high costs and political opposition of a TRC. The
purpose of these meetings would be for victims and perpetrators to share
their experiences during the reign of the Khmer Rouge and help paint a
broader picture of the past. To secure greater political support, such town
meetings could be voluntary and request, though not require, perpetrators to
disclose their crimes. As noted above, one of the main reasons Hun Sen
opposed the creation of a TRC was fear that a TRC would instill panic in
former Khmer Rouge.229 To reduce costs as well as ensure greater
legitimacy, well-respected leaders in the community could volunteer to
preside over these meetings. Additionally, these meetings could be held in
public spaces instead of requiring that they be housed in lavish courthouses.
225
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As a supplement to the CEC,230 town meetings could help resolve the
tension between the CEC and Article 52. Like TRCs, town meetings can
provide victims a forum to share their stories without the inhibiting rigors of
criminal prosecutions. In contrast to criminal prosecutions, town meetings
can provide far greater freedom on who can speak and how they can speak;
thus, they can provide a far more comprehensive picture of the truth.231
Additionally, in a society in which the independence of the judiciary is
highly questionable, town meetings can provide a greater guarantee of
impartiality than a criminal tribunal. Although one could argue that victims
would never attend such meetings for fear of retribution, it is promising that
Cambodians have been willing to attend town meetings to discuss the CEC
despite the presence of former Khmer Rouge at these gatherings.232
The Cambodian government should also provide greater access to
mental health services.233 The Cambodian people continue to suffer from
severe emotional and mental trauma as a result of the Khmer Rouge
atrocities.234 The Transcultural Psychosocial Organisation (“TPO”), an
independent non-profit agency based in Amsterdam, currently provides
mental health services and counseling throughout Cambodia; however, its
centers have limited resources that reach few Cambodians.235 Thus,
providing greater access to mental health services to Cambodia’s urban and
rural populations would allow for Cambodians to receive the healing and
emotional reparation that the CEC does not provide. Although such services
are not without cost, the government could provide such services on a
sliding scale fee to minimize expenditures.
These informal mechanisms may not provide the same level of
national reconciliation that a TRC could provide, nor may they constitute the
perfect solution to addressing the tension between Article 52 and the CEC.
230
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Nonetheless, given the infeasibility of a TRC for Cambodia, town meetings
and greater mental health care access are more practical supplements.
VII. CONCLUSION
The upcoming Khmer Rouge trials promise to provide national
reconciliation to a population that has suffered years of terror and trauma at
the hands of the Khmer Rouge. Though national reconciliation is an
important policy generally, Cambodia’s Constitution mandates the “policy of
national reconciliation.”236 Article 52 requires that Cambodia not pursue
policies that undermine truth or healing. However, the CEC’s failure to
safeguard the impartiality and legitimacy of the tribunal and its limited
public participation and personal jurisdiction will undermine these essential
principles. Though criminal prosecutions are necessary to the extent that
they satisfy Cambodia’s obligations under the Genocide Convention, the
Cambodian government should supplement its tribunal with mechanisms to
promote the very reconciliation that the tribunal undermines. Given
Cambodia’s political and economic realities, the Cambodian government
should look to less politically contentious and more economically feasible
mechanisms than a TRC in order to supplement the CEC.
Absent meaningful steps to supplement the CEC with mechanisms
that address the tension between Article 52 of the Cambodian Constitution
and the CEC, the Khmer Rouge trials will fail to appease the hearts and
minds of the real victims of these atrocities, the Cambodian people.
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